




he central point of Milton and Rose Friedman’s best seller Free to Choose
is that markets leave freedom of choice to individuals, while governments
negate it. While this basic argument is clearly right, it is often objected to
on grounds that it holds only for the well-offs. For many poor people around
the world, the freedom markets grant seems to be more theoretical than real. 
Consider, for instance, Sufiya Begum, a poor Bangladeshi stool maker.
Theoretically, she is free to choose what to produce and for whom to produce.
But she lacks the twenty-two cents necessary to buy the raw material for the
stools she makes. Not having that money and lacking any opportunity to bor-
row it, Sufiya has no other choice but to accept the terms offered by the only
middleman in town. He lends her the raw material but requires her to sell the
stools back to him. Of course, he sets the price. Thus, lacking the initial
resources, Sufiya is de facto enslaved to the middleman, who pays her only two
cents for a hard day’s labor. 
One could quickly dismiss this argument on the basis of its assumption.
Why is there only one middleman in town? Markets provide freedom of choice
only when there is competition. Without competition, there is no freedom. Mil-
ton and Rose would certainly agree with that. Does this imply, however, that
Milton and Rose’s argument in favor of markets depends crucially on the feasi-
bility of competitive markets? If so, its power might be significantly reduced.
While Milton and Rose probably do not believe in the existence of natural
monopolies, many economists do, especially when we are talking about poor
developing countries. And regardless of the theoretical arguments, there are the
facts. In Jobra, Sufiya Begum’s village, there was only one middleman. So what
freedom did markets offer to her? 
We think instead that the major obstacle to Sufiya Begum’s freedom of
choice is not the existence of just one middleman in town but the lack of access
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to finance. If she could have access to some form of borrowing, Sufiya Begum
could shop around for better prices and free herself. 
If you had any doubt, consider the way access to finance has changed
the life of another Bangladeshi woman, Delora Begum (no relationship with
Sufiya). Delora was no different from Sufiya and millions of Bangladeshis, liv-
ing in a straw hut with a corrugated metal sheet for a roof, a mud floor, and no
toilet or running water. Thanks to a loan from the Grameen Bank (a develop-
ment bank promoted by Bangladeshi economist Muhammad Yunus), however,
she was able to acquire a Nokia cellular phone.
1 In a region of the world where
it would be a compliment to call the traditional telephone network unreliable,
the phone has made a world of difference in her life and in the lives of her fel-
low villagers. 
The phone brings information at low cost to the farmers and tradesmen in
the village; farmers can learn the fair value of their produce in the market, giv-
ing them an edge in bargaining with the notoriously exploitative middlemen;
carpenters can find the current price of wood so they can get a better price for
their furniture. The phone also reduces the cost of doing business. A local brick
factory owner can order supplies on the phone rather than wasting time mak-
ing the two-and-a-half-hour, bumpy, biweekly trip to Dhaka. Perhaps even
more important, the phone helps save lives. A pregnant woman’s life was saved
when a call on the phone brought a doctor who could help. 
The phone costs $375, and the monthly profits Delora Begum makes on it
are about twice the average national monthly income. It has changed her life.
Not only has she bought new possessions like a table and chairs, she now has
status: “People consider me a person of honor,” she told the Wall Street Journal
staffer who reported the story.
While the cellular technology that frees her from the tyranny of the state-
owned phone lines plays a big part in this story, the availability of finance plays
an even bigger one. The availability of finance ensures the maximum individual
economic freedom possible. In the words of Mohammed Yunus, the founder of
the Grameen Bank:
2
If we imagine a world where every human being is a potential entrepreneur,
we’ll build a system to give everybody a chance to materialize his or her
potential. The heavy wall between the “entrepreneur” and “labor” will be
meaningless. If labor had access to capital, this world would be very differ-
ent from what we have now.
Yunus’ inspiring words nicely summarize the centrality of access to finance to
economic freedom. Yet is there any systematic evidence to support his state-
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FINANCE AND COMPETITION
Competition is what ensures our economic freedom. Competition gives us
choices, improves the quality of the goods and services we buy, protects us
against exploitation. Does greater access to finance promote competition? 
Financial development seems to facilitate new entry. The deregulation of
U.S. banking led to a substantial increase in the degree of development and
competition in the financial sector in states that deregulated. These states expe-
rienced a significant increase in the rate of creation of new enterprises after
deregulation.
3 Similarly, more new establishments are created in countries with
more advanced financial systems, and this effect is more pronounced in indus-
tries that depend more on external finance, suggesting that availability of
finance is indeed the cause of this increase.
4
That financial development facilitates new entry, however, does not mean
it necessarily reduces economic concentration: Established firms could benefit
even more from financial development than entrants, acquiring a greater share
of production and squeezing out competition. We can therefore look at the
effects of financial development on competition more directly.
One measure of the degree of competition is the profit margin. All other
things being equal, a firm in a more competitive market should have a lower
profit margin. If firms in areas that have better access to finance have lower
profit margins, this would suggest access to finance makes competition more
intense. To check this, let us go to Italy, where there are tremendous variations
across regions in the quality of the financial system. (Milton and Rose would not
be surprised to learn that such difference was caused by a 1936 government reg-
ulation.)
5 As a result of these differences, an individual with similar personal
characteristics has twice the probability of being rejected for a loan in certain
Italian regions than in others, even after adjusting for economic factors that
should matter. 
These regional differences in access to finance seem to affect competition
at the local level. Firms in the most financially developed regions have a profit
margin 1.6 percentage points lower—about a third below the average profit
margin of 5.9 percent—than in the least financially developed region. Reassur-
ingly, this effect is present only for small and medium firms. Large firms can
raise funds nationwide, and competition in industries with large firms should
not be affected by local financial development.
6
Perhaps the most reassuring evidence of the effects of finance on compe-
tition would come if we found an industry where access to capital is the pri-
mary barrier to entry and then compared competition in this industry across a
number of countries over time. 
Such an industry indeed exists—the cotton textile industry—and it has
been studied by Stephen Haber.
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in this industry has, historically, not been large; therefore, incumbent firms
could not build tremendous barriers to entry by setting up massive plants. More-
over, over the period it was studied—approximately the second half of the
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century—there were few
important patents in the industry and advertising did not play a major role. As
a result, the main barrier to entry was the financing required to acquire the small
but not insignificant amount of plant, machinery, and working capital needed
for production. Haber compares the industry in two countries (Mexico and
Brazil) at a similar level of economic development. 
In 1883, Brazil had forty-four textile firms with approximately 66,000 spin-
dles. The fraction of sales accounted for by the four largest firms was as high as
37 percent. In 1878, Mexico had almost twice as many firms, four times as many
spindles, and its four largest firms accounted for only 16 percent of sales. Thus,
the Mexican textile industry started out much bigger and less concentrated.
8
In 1883, however, Brazil liberalized entry in its banking sector, while Mex-
ico did not. A few decades later, the relative position in the textile industry was
reversed. In 1915, Brazil had 180 firms, nearly 1.5 million spindles, and the four
largest firms accounted for only 16 percent of sales. By contrast, in Mexico in
1912, there were only 100 firms, approximately three-quarters of a million spin-
dles, and the four largest firms now accounted for 27 percent of sales.
9 Not only
did Brazilian industry grow faster, it also became less concentrated! 
FINANCE AND INDIVIDUAL MOBILITY
What we have just seen is that finance helps upstart corporations enter and
challenge the establishment, thus keeping competition keen and refreshing. Let
us now see if it also helps expand opportunity for individuals.
One obvious way to measure how finance expands opportunities is to
assess its impact on the probability that individuals will start out on their own.
Self-employment, whether as a plumber or a storekeeper, typically requires initial
funds. For all but the lucky few who were born wealthy, the financial system is
the only source for these funds. Thus, a more developed financial system should
make it easier for individuals to become self-employed. What is the evidence?
Across Italian regions, differences in availability of finance translate into
differences in individual mobility. Even after controlling for other regional dif-
ferences, an individual living in the most financially developed region is 33 per-
cent more likely to start out on her own than an individual with the same char-
acteristics living in the least financially developed regions.
10 By reducing the
importance of initial wealth, financial development also allows people to start
out younger on their own. In the most financially developed regions, entrepre-
neurs are on average 5.5 years younger. Thus, financial development has a sig-
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Another way to measure mobility is to look at the very rich and see how
they came by their wealth. Since 1987, Forbes has put out a list of the world’s
richest people, indicating whether they inherited the bulk of their wealth or
whether they are self-made. The last year for which Forbes reported all the peo-
ple whose wealth exceeded $1 billion was 1996 (after that, the number of bil-
lionaires became too large). We start by looking at the number of billionaires
present in each country in 1996. This is largely before the Internet boom cre-
ated a whole new generation of instant (and ephemeral) billionaires. To com-
pare countries with very different sizes, we divide the number of billionaires by
how many million people live in that country. 
The country with the highest frequency of billionaires per million inhabi-
tants is Hong Kong (2.6), followed by Bahrain and Switzerland (1.7), and Singa-
pore (1.4). At the bottom of the distribution we find poorer countries like Peru
(0.04) but also rich countries like Norway (0) and South Africa (0.05). 
More revealing than the frequency of billionaires is the frequency of self-
made billionaires per million inhabitants. Not surprisingly, countries that have
grown fast recently, such as Japan and the Asian Tigers—Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, South Korea, and Taiwan—tend to have a high frequency of self-made
billionaires. What is interesting is that the frequency of self-made billionaires per
million inhabitants in the United States (0.26 per million) is much higher than
that in the large European countries; the United Kingdom, Germany, and France
have on average 0.08 self-made billionaires per million. 
There is a very strong positive correlation between the frequency of self-
made billionaires in a country and the size of its equity market. This correlation
is not just due to Hong Kong, which stands out on both measures. If we elimi-
nate the former British colony, the positive correlation persists. An increase in
the size of the equity market from the level in France (50 percent of GDP in
1996) to the level in the United States (140 percent of GDP) would be associ-
ated with an increase in the frequency of self-made billionaires in France from
0.07 per million to approximately 0.3. All the difference between the United
States and France in the frequency of self-made billionaires per million inhabi-
tants can be explained by the better-developed financial markets in the United
States!
11
All we have is a correlation, which, as we have previously emphasized, is
not evidence of causation. A lot of other factors, such as the extent to which a
country favors free enterprise, may affect the ability of an individual to accu-
mulate a fortune during her lifetime. As long as these other factors are relatively
constant, however, we can eliminate their influence by looking at changes in
the frequency of billionaires per million people over a certain period of time.
Since the earliest survey conducted by Forbes is in 1987, we look at the changes
in the frequency of self-made billionaires between 1987 and 1996. During this
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tries that started the decade with a more developed financial system. The effect
on the frequency of inheriting billionaires is much smaller. 
THE INCREASED VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL 
Until around the middle of the nineteenth century, the U.S. (and world)
economy had few firms with more than a hundred employees. Most were man-
aged by their owners. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, a new orga-
nizational form emerged: large, vertically integrated firms that Alfred Chandler
calls the modern business enterprise. One of the key characteristics of this new
form of organization was its capital intensity. Between 1869 and 1899, capital
invested per worker in the United States nearly tripled in constant dollars.
This capital intensity coupled with the underdeveloped stage of finance
gave these firms an enormous staying power. Of those firms on the U.S. For-
tune 500 in 1994, 247, or nearly half, were founded between 1880 and 1930.
The early firms include Kodak, Johnson & Johnson, Coca-Cola, and Sears, all
founded in the 1880s, and General Electric, PepsiCo, and Goodyear in the
1890s.
12 Firms have been even more durable in Germany. Of the thirty largest
German firms ranked by sales in 1994, nineteen were founded between 1860
and 1930 and four even earlier. The nineteen firms include household names
like Daimler Benz, BMW, Hoechst, Bayer, and BASF.
13
As a result, workers, even very senior managers, could not contemplate
life outside the firm. The only source of protection was coming from competi-
tion from other firms, not from the possibility of breaking away and creating
their own firm. Competition works best for more homogenous products, so
unskilled workers were relatively better protected than more senior managers,
who had more firm-specific human capital. Consistently, between 1890 and
1950—the period of the rise of Chandler’s large industrial enterprise—there was
a tremendous compression of the wages of educated white-collar workers rela-
tive to blue-collar workers.
14 The ratio of wages of clerical employees to those
of production workers fell from approximately 1.7 to 1.1 between 1890 and
1950. Because typically the educated are also relatively more skilled, these facts
are consistent with the consolidation of industry into large, monolithic organi-
zations shackling the skilled and compressing the wage differential. Of course,
other factors also partly account for this compression. As with all economic
resources, demand and supply ultimately determine the relative prices of skilled
labor. Our point is simply that access to finance may have had a profound influ-
ence on both demand and supply. 
Developments in finance in the last three decades, however, have inverted
this trend. With the diffusion of leasing arrangements and highly leveraged
transactions, alienable assets such as plant and equipment have become less
unique, especially to those with specific skills. This has reduced the barrier toFinancial Markets and Economic Freedom 181
entry created by high capital intensity. As a result, managers in a division are
no longer beholden to the parent because the latter owns their assets. If need
be, they can break away, raise finance directly in the market, and replicate the
assets. The possibility of starting up on one’s own has opened up new possi-
bilities for those who, hitherto, were locked into their firms because of special-
ization—in particular, the older workers whose mobility seems to have
increased. From the firm’s perspective, resources other than alienable assets
have become more critical to its ability to survive competition. From the owner’s
perspective, these resources—people, ideas, strategies—are harder to control
directly. Because specific skills are not only more valuable in this era but also
more mobile, it is no wonder that skilled workers are being paid more. This rise
in competition has put a premium on skills. Consistently, between 1979 and
1987, the average weekly wage of college graduates with one to five years of
experience increased by 30 percent relative to the average weekly earnings of
comparable high school graduates.
15
Even more important, the options created by the availability of finance
have altered the balance of power between capital and labor, in favor of the latter.
The single biggest challenge for owners and top management today is to man-
age in an atmosphere of diminished authority. Authority has to be gained by
persuading lower managers and workers that the workplace is an attractive one
and one that they would hate to lose. To do this, top management has to ensure
that work is enriching, that responsibilities are handed down, and that rich
bonds develop between workers and between themselves and workers. The
emphasis on a kinder, gentler firm in most recent management tomes is not
without foundation.
Finally, in addition to increasing the wages of the skilled and increasing
their power within firms, these changes have also increased the opportunities
for innovation. Inventors in high-tech firms who do not feel their ideas are
appreciated or rewarded can leave and get them financed elsewhere. Intel—
one of the most innovative and profitable firms of our time—was started by
Gordon Moore and Robert Noyce because they felt their employer, Fairchild
Semiconductor, was ignoring important new technologies they believed in.
More generally, a recent study reports that 71 percent of the firms included in
the U.S. Inc. 500 (a list of young, fast-growing firms) were founded by people
who replicated or modified an idea encountered in their previous employment.
16
In a sense, therefore, improvement in finance has ensured the maximum
individual economic freedom possible.
WHY WE DO NOT SEE MORE FINANCE 
Given all the benefits finance brings to people, why don’t we see more of
it? Why between 1880 and 1915 did Mexicans have to suffer more than Brazil-182 Luigi Zingales
ians? Why does access to finance differ so much across Italian regions? Why did
it take Mohammed Yunus to give Delora what Sufiya does not have?
The Roadblock to Finance
As Raghuram Rajan and I elaborate in our book Saving Capitalism from
the Capitalists, the answer is very simple. Financing is a very risky and complex
activity. It implies exchanging a sum of money today for a promise of a bigger
sum in the future. This promise is fraught with risks: the risk that people bor-
row with the intention of not repaying (adverse selection), the risk that they
might not work as hard in repaying it (moral hazard), and the risk that the gov-
ernment intervenes, reducing the value of that promise. While the first two types
of risks seem greater, it is the third one that creates the main obstacle to the
development of finance. In fact, human ingenuity has created a lot of mecha-
nisms to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Consider, for instance, the tremendous challenge of lending in
Bangladesh. Given the creaky pace of the legal system, it is all too easy for a
borrower to take a loan, consume the proceeds, and then default. Hence, no
honest banker is willing to lend unless the borrower is already trusted or
wealthy. Corrupt bankers are willing to lend, of course, but the borrower has to
kick back so much of the loaned amount to the banker for him to ignore credit
standards that only borrowers who do not intend to pay loans back take them.
Ordinary decent people like Sufiya Begum have to rely on local moneylenders
who levy usurious rates of interest and use extralegal threats of violence to
extort repayment.
Even in this extreme situation, human ingenuity has created an alternative.
The Grameen Bank, the institution that lent money to Delora Begum, works on
the same principle as the moneylender—the borrower should have an incen-
tive to repay—but is much more civilized in its methods. Here is how it oper-
ates: A woman who wants to borrow (the Grameen Bank finds women more
reliable) must find four other friends who are eligible for membership. The
women cannot be related to each other, and they must agree to help each other
when in difficulty. If any member of the group cannot repay, the others must
help repay the defaulter’s loan or risk seeing their own credit lines diminished.
Not all the group get loans at the same time. Two members get a loan, and
when they have established a record of prompt payment, the next two become
eligible, and eventually the last member. As the group repays, it becomes eligi-
ble for larger and larger loans. 
The beauty of this method is that initially, peer pressure from members
within the group—who are often in the same social circles—forces repayment.
Because the initial loans are for small amounts, peer pressure works. Moreover,
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often when one is living at the margin. But eventually, the group’s excellent
record of past repayment becomes an asset—its reputation—that is worth pre-
serving in its own right because it is the source of access to credit. While the
bank has to coach the group intensively at high cost for the first few loans,
eventually the group becomes as creditworthy as any rich rice merchant in
Dhaka and graduates to larger, more cost-effective loans. Repayment rates on
loans to even the very poor are extremely high, allowing the bank to charge
moderate rates of interest. 
So creative arrangements can overcome many of the challenges posed by
moral hazard and adverse selection. They find it impossible, however, to over-
come the interference of the government. Consider, for instance, the case of
another developing country with poor law enforcement: Paraguay.
17 In that
country, the major obstacle to lending is not due to the absence of proper laws
but to the presence of crazy ones. One law, for instance, allows creditors who
lend small amounts (up to $2,650) to take as collateral only small assets such as
appliances and prevents them from collecting more than 25 percent of the value
of these assets. To make the problem worse, the lack of public registry allows
borrowers to trade the goods posted as collateral without the lender’s knowl-
edge. So the collateral often disappears by the time the creditor realizes the bor-
rower intends to default. The result is that creditors are reluctant to make loans
even if the borrower has the collateral to pledge. While this law was sold as a
way to protect the poor from the rapacity of the financiers, it ended up dam-
aging the very people it allegedly wanted to help. 
Paraguayans’ ingenuity, however, found a way around these restrictions by
using postdated checks. Until 1996 checks written against accounts without
funds in them (bounced checks) were considered a form of swindling, and
those who wrote such checks could go to jail. So debtors who had no collateral
could sign a check for the principal amount to be repaid with the future date
on which the loan matured on it. If on that date the borrower did not have the
money to pay, lenders could go to the bank, present the check, and have pay-
ment formally refused by the bank because of inadequate funds in the account.
They could then take the bounced check to a judge, who would issue an order
of arrest. If the debtor still did not pay, the lender could put him in jail. This
threat ensured that borrowers would pay up if they could because they would
do anything to avoid going to prison. 
The outcome if the lender defaults is, of course, not civilized. It harkens
back to Dickensian times and the debtors’ prisons that Mr. Micawber frequented.
And defaults are not infrequent, suggesting that many on the margin are willing
to take the risk of incarceration just to obtain financing. One estimate of the
criminal proceedings in Paraguay that relate to bounced checks is between 30
and 40 percent. In the 1990s, about 10 percent of the National Penitentiary pop-
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were willing to take the risk of losing their freedom to obtain financing suggests
how important it is in ameliorating their lives. 
In 1996, however, the Paraguayan parliament eliminated the criminal sanc-
tion on bounced checks. While this might appear as a very humanitarian meas-
ure meant to reduce the number of inmates, it had devastating effects on the
credit market. Without the criminal penalty, entrepreneurs could not post their
future livelihood as collateral. But because the other law, limiting the ability to
collateralize assets, was not repealed, they had no collateral to post. It is no sur-
prise that the volume of lending dropped. 
At first sight, the perverse effect of the repeal of one law and the uphold-
ing of the other could be perceived as an innocent mistake of a well-meaning
Paraguayan government. Unfortunately, these “mistakes” are so common and so
pervasive, even in more developed countries, that it is hard to believe in sheer
bad luck. 
For example, in an attempt to protect households from the consumer
credit industry that “forced” them to take too much debt, the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States argued in 1973 that it would be ben-
eficial for less-well-off households if they could retain some assets after filing
for bankruptcy. Following these recommendations, a number of states adopted
exemptions. Some of these were extremely generous. For instance, in Texas, a
bankrupt person can retain his house no matter how expensive it is, in addition
to $30,000 of other property. A bankruptcy exemption is a form of insurance—
it prevents the borrower from losing everything in case of a personal calamity.
This can make borrowers more willing to tolerate high debt levels. But it also
prevents the exempt assets from serving as collateral, making lenders less will-
ing to offer loans. Not surprisingly, higher state bankruptcy exemptions led to
a significantly higher probability that households would be turned down for
credit or discouraged from borrowing.
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More interestingly, poor households were disproportionately adversely
affected. Because their house is often their only form of collateral, the exemp-
tion laws effectively deprived them of their only means of obtaining finance.
They had much less access to borrowing in the high-exemption states, and paid
higher interest rates, than in the low-exemption states. By contrast, rich house-
holds typically have enough unprotected assets to borrow. The diminished will-
ingness of financiers to lend after the passage of the exemptions did not affect
them much. In fact, their debt went up in high-exemption states: Rich house-
holds became more willing to borrow because more of their assets could be
protected from seizure. Thus, financial legislation that was intended to help
poor households ended up hurting them and benefiting the well-to-do. These
examples are more common than one could ascribe purely to legislative igno-
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Cui Prodest?
In every good mystery novel, when coincidences become overwhelming,
the detective starts looking for a motive. Why do governments throughout the
world, with the pretense of helping the poor, hurt them by depriving them of
access to finance? Who benefits from it? 
If finance does indeed breed competition and favors social mobility—as
we argue it does—the people who will lose from financial development are
those currently well-off, the owners of the established firms, who fear competi-
tion and would like to freeze societal and economic positions at their current
level. 
Consider, for instance, established large industrial firms in an economy, a
group we will call industrial incumbents. In normal times, these incumbents do
not require a developed financial system. They can finance new projects out of
earnings—as most established firms do—without accessing external capital
markets. Even when their business does not generate sufficient cash to fund
desired investments, they can use the collateral from existing projects and their
prior reputation to borrow. Such borrowing does not require much sophistica-
tion from the financial system—even a primitive system will provide funds will-
ingly against collateral. Because of their privileged access to finance in under-
developed financial systems, incumbents enjoy a positional rent. Anybody else
who starts a promising business has to sell it to the incumbents or get them to
fund it. Thus, not only do incumbents enjoy some rents in the markets they
operate in, but they also end up appropriating most of the returns from new
ventures.
These rents will be impaired by financial development. The better disclo-
sure rules and enforcement in a developed financial market will reduce the rela-
tive importance of incumbents’ collateral and reputation, while permitting new-
comers to enter and compete away profits. 
Similar arguments apply to incumbent financiers. While financial develop-
ment provides them with an opportunity to expand their activities, it also strikes
at their very source of comparative advantage. In the absence of good disclo-
sure and proper enforcement, financing is typically relationship-based. The finan-
cier uses his connections to obtain information to monitor his loans and uses his
various informal levers of power to cajole repayment. Key, therefore, to his abil-
ity to lend are his relationships with those who have influence over the firm
(managers, other lenders, suppliers, politicians, etc.) and his ability to monop-
olize the provision of finance to a client (either through a monopoly over firm-
specific information or through a friendly cartel among financiers). Disclosure
and impartial enforcement tend to level the playing field and reduce barriers to
entry into the financial sector. The incumbent financier’s old skills become
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necessary. Financial development not only introduces competition, which
destroys the financial institution’s rents and its relationships, it also destroys the
financier’s human capital.
After the 1994 Mexican crisis, for instance, the World Bank decided to help
the government improve the financial infrastructure. One of the fundamental
institutions that were missing was a credit registry, where assets posted as col-
lateral for a loan could be officially recorded so that any potential lenders could
be aware of what a borrower had already pledged. In setting up this registry,
the World Bank experienced strong resistance from the existing banks. Why?
Existing banks had enough clout that they could get this information regardless
of the credit registry. Not only would they not benefit from it, but they would
see their competitive position eroded as less established lenders could access
that information and compete for business on an equal footing. Access to credit
was curtailed to support the interests of the few! 
In sum, a more efficient financial system facilitates entry and thus leads to
lower profits for incumbent firms and financial institutions. From the perspec-
tive of incumbents, the competition-enhancing effects of financial development
may offset the other undoubted benefits that financial development brings.
Moreover, markets tend to be democratic, and they particularly jeopardize ways
of doing business that rely on unequal access. Thus, not only are incumbents
likely to benefit less from financial development, they might actually lose. This
would imply that incumbents might collectively have a vested interest in pre-
venting financial development and might be small enough to organize success-
fully against it.
19 In doing so, they will be able to rely on other incumbent groups
such as organized labor that previous studies have shown benefit from an econ-
omy with limited competition.
20
The Spreading of Financial Markets 
In spite of this strong opposition to finance, a veritable revolution has
taken place in this field throughout much of the developed world in the last
three decades. In 1970, the ratio of the value of all listed U.S. stocks to GDP was
0.66; by the year 2000 it had climbed to 1.5.
21 The increase in other countries is
even more dramatic. In France, stock market capitalization rose from just 0.16
of GDP in 1970 to 1.1 times GDP in the year 2000.
22 The explosion in the size
of stock markets is just one indication of what has happened. Entire new mar-
kets such as Nasdaq have emerged, catering specifically to young firms. Institu-
tions such as money market funds did not exist in the early 1970s; now they
hold over $2 trillion in assets in the United States. A large number of financial
derivatives that are commonplace today, such as index options or interest rate
swaps, had not been invented three decades ago. The turnover in the trading
of such derivative instruments was $163 trillion in the fourth quarter of 2001,Financial Markets and Economic Freedom 187
about 16 times the annual GDP of the United States.
23
In the same way as corporations have obtained new instruments with
which to raise finance and allocate risks, individuals also now have expanded
choices. Revolving consumer credit such as credit card debt exploded from near
nothing in the United States in the late 1960s to nearly $700 billion in late 2001.
24
Firms and individuals can borrow not just from domestic institutions but also
from foreign markets and institutions. Gross cross-border capital flows as a frac-
tion of GDP have increased nearly tenfold in developed countries since 1970
and more than fivefold for developing countries. In the decade of the 1990s
alone, these flows more than quadrupled for developed countries.
25
Why have politicians in countries as diverse as France and Germany or
Korea and India embraced the market and attempted to provide the governance
markets need? It is difficult to imagine that politicians have suddenly become
more public-spirited. The answer, we believe, is that the interests of the elites
have changed with the opening of borders to goods and capital. This has made
domestic elites press their politicians to enact market-friendly legislation. 
The effect of open borders on government policy can be clearly seen in
the Indian software industry. Unlike much of Indian industry, which for years
had been held back by government regulation intended to protect the positions
of a few existing family-owned firms, there were no incumbents in this sunrise
industry. Smuggling provided an initial impetus as cheap computer parts were
brought in, bypassing extortionate tariffs and giving software engineers access
to cheap computers. But as the industry grew, it gained political clout. Tariffs
were brought down so the industry could work more legitimately. The industry
also became internationally competitive. 
Now, even when some players in the industry have become dominant,
they are not particularly interested in suppressing domestic competition.
Instead, people like Narayan Murthy, the head of Indian software giant Infosys,
are pressing for better infrastructure, such as better corporate governance that
will let them raise finance more cheaply and more educational institutions that
will allow them to train their personnel. Everyone, including their domestic
rivals, benefits. The software industry is pushing India toward building infra-
structure for the market. Openness has been critical to this process.
In sum, as borders open up to the flow of goods and capital, incumbent
firms now need well-functioning domestic markets so that they can take advan-
tage of the opportunities provided by the global market, as well as meet foreign
competition head-on. The prospect of increased domestic competition matters
less when they are fighting on the world stage. They now back rather than
oppose domestic markets. Put differently, competition between economies
through open borders forces politicians to enact the rules that will make their
economies competitive. This typically means enacting market-friendly legisla-
tion and making markets accessible to all. 188 Luigi Zingales
CONCLUSIONS
Widespread access to finance is an integral pillar of our freedom to
choose. Without it, many of the opportunities offered by the market are more
hypothetical than real. In spite of the enormous challenges intrinsic to the
financing activity, human ingenuity, when allowed to work freely, is able to
devise many mechanisms to enlarge access to finance. It cannot, however, over-
come the power of the government, when this is determined to block finance.
Unfortunately, governments are too often captured by rich incumbents, who
stand to gain very little and risk a lot from the development of finance. 
Openness is a powerful antidote against the power of incumbents. Inter-
national competition weakens both the incentives of incumbent firms to oppose
financial development and their ability to do so. Not coincidentally, the last
twenty-five years, which have witnessed an opening up of world trade, have
also experienced a surge in financial development. 
Unfortunately, international tensions and recent economic downturns have
slowed down and threatened to reverse the process of world market integra-
tion. As economists, as disciples of Milton Friedman, but most important, as citi-
zens, we have to fight this trend, which can significantly affect the freedom to
choose of generations to come. 
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